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Abstract
Sex is considered as an evolutionary paradox, since its positive contribution to Darwinian fitness remains unverified for
some species. Defenses against unpredictable threats (parasites, fluctuating environment and deleterious mutations) are
indeed significantly improved by wider genetic variability and by positive epistasis gained by sexual reproduction. The
corresponding evolutionary advantages, however, do not overcome universally the barrier of the two-fold cost for sharing
half of one’s offspring genome with another member of the population. Here we show that sexual reproduction emerges
and is maintained even when its Darwinian fitness is twice as low as the fitness of asexuals. We also show that more than
two sexes (inheritance of genetic material from three or even more parents) are always evolutionary unstable. Our approach
generalizes the evolutionary game theory to analyze species whose members are able to sense the sexual state of their
conspecifics and to adapt their own sex consequently, either by switching or by taxis towards the highest concentration of
the complementary sex. The widespread emergence and maintenance of sex follows therefore from its co-evolution with
the even more widespread environmental sensing abilities.
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Introduction
All modern sexual species emerged from asexual ancestors.
Some populations have experienced multiple transitions between
sexual and asexual reproductive modes [1], others are capable of
changing repeatedly either their sex or mode of reproduction in the
course of a single generation [2]. One should explain these
transitions and the subsequent maintenance of the reproductive
mode on the basis of Darwinian natural selection, finding
evolutionary advantages for asexual individuals to differentiate into
egg-producing females and sperm-producing males or vice versa.
A paradox emerges by assuming that sexual reproduction
increases the Darwinian fitness of a population. Sex implies
universally a two-fold fitness cost [3,4]. A sexual individual shares
half of one’s offspring genome, while an asexual one generates an
almost exact replica of itself. Sexual reproduction transfers thus
only half of the individual’s genes to the next generation, when
compared to parthenogenesis. This results in a two-fold increase in
the cost of sex (or of males), assuming no other advantages or
shortcomings for the existence of males in a population. This high
basic cost causes difficulties to confirm generally that sexual
reproduction increases the Darwinian fitness.
The advantages of sexual reproduction stem from quite various
roots [5]. For instance, sex increases genetic variability by
recombination of the parental chromosomes [6,7]. It makes a
population more resistant against many unpredictable threats,
such as deleterious mutations [8,9], parasites [10,11], a fluctuating
environment [6,12,13] or competing groups [14]. It also optimizes
the evolutionary search for the best gene combinations in a single
individual (epistasis [15,16]).
Quantitative comparison between costs and advantages of sex
can lead to counterintuitive results. For instance, one may estimate
the number of deleterious mutation per generation required to make
sexual diversity worth its two-fold cost [8]. The derived prediction of
one deleterious mutation per generation seems unnaturally high in
the light of relevant experimental results [17]. Other qualitative
contradictions are discussed in many reviews questioning our
understanding of both sexual [9,18] and asexual [1,19] species.
The paradox of sex can be solved either by presenting a strong
and ubiquitous advantage for sex applicable to all sexual species or
by showing how it can evolve despite the reduction to the
Darwinian fitness. In this Article we demonstrate the later,
showing that sex can maintain its stability even at twice the cost of
parthogenesis. According to our results, even a minor sex-
promoting effect such as a small amount of deleterious mutations
may explain the maintenance and emergence of sexual reproduc-
tion, since the requirement for an absolute increase of Darwinian
fitness is eliminated in this context. We show that this stability can
be achieved through elementary mechanisms of sensing the sexual
composition of the environment. Such an ability promotes
assortative, instead of random, encounters between complemen-
tary sexes by adjustment of the individual’s sex or location
correspondingly to the environment.
Our proposal for evolution of sex is analogous to evolution of
social phenomena, such as cooperation (for a recent review see
[20] and references therein). For instance, stability of cooperation
may be achieved by preferential interaction between individuals
that are willing to cooperate and are able to recognize other
cooperators, implying that interactions in such a population cease
to be random. Assortative encounters increase and maintain
cooperation, though do not necessarily lead to an absolute gain in
average Darwinian fitness of the population. Reduction of fitness is
common in social models, e.g. evolutionary stable defection in the
case of Prisoner’s Dilemma [21].
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To discuss the emergence and maintenance of sex, we assume
its onset in the development of assortative interactions between
complementary sexes, as a consequence of evolving abilities to
sense the sexual distribution of the near environment and to
optimize the individual’s state correspondingly [22,23]. These
skills remain in modern species: attraction (similar to chemotaxis)
between different sexes is ubiquitous in all animals [24,25] and
some species, even vertebrates, are able to change sex as a function
of their environment [2].
Consider a population composed of organisms possessing either
of two sexes F or M. In an asexual population each individual is in
the F state. A sexual population corresponds to individuals who are
always in the sexual state that is complementary to the average sex
of the environment: F in a M environment or M in a F
environment. We assume the emergence of mutants M, having, in
addition to self-reproduction (albeit lower than their hosts F), also
an initially limited ability to pass on their genetic material to the F
environment.
The development of sexual reproduction is governed by its
evolutionary payoffs Wpq of sex p in environment of sex q
p,q[ F,M fg ðÞ :
Wpq~
FM
FW FF WFM
MW MF WMM
: ð1Þ
These payoffs include all relevant biological causes contributing to
the cost and benefits of different reproduction mechanisms.
Payoffs are in general asymmetric, WFM=WMF corresponding
to unequal costs for males and females. The Darwinian fitness G
of an individual can be associated with its mean payoff from all
possible situations (F in F, F in M, M in F and M in M). It is
determined, therefore, by the individual probabilities to have a
specific sex under particular circumstances. These probabilities
are defined by the individual characteristics (phenotypes), such as
specific sensor, sex taxis or sex switch skills. Evolution proceeds
by generations; the existing phenotypes in a population are
replaced by favorable mutants possessing greater fitness due to
their better abilities. This process culminates in an evolutionary
stable population where no mutants can outperform the host
phenotype.
The evolutionary stable state of a population is determined by
the values of the payoffs Wpq.W ea s s u m et h a tWFFwWMM,
indicating that initial asexual populations were composed of
individuals F only. The fitness in an asexual population is
Ga~WFF. The average fitness in a sexual population Gs is given
by WFMzWMF=2, since an individual is either F in environ-
ment of M or M in environment of F. The cost of sex
corresponds to the ratio of average fitness in asexual and sexual
population:
Cs~Ga=Gs~WFF= WFMzWMF ðÞ =2 ðÞ : ð2Þ
One can analyze, therefore, the evolutionary stability of a sexual
populations as a function of cost of sex Cs.
In natural populations, the cost of sex is
Cs~2zd, ð3Þ
where dindicates deviations from the exact two-fold value. For
instance, advantages of sex, such as greater diversity, may reduce
Cs dv0 ðÞ . On the other hand, sex may possess additional
shortcomings, e.g slower replication mechanisms (dw0). Sexual
reproduction is fitter than the asexual one if Csv1. Emergence
and maintenance of sex is considered as a paradox, since the cost
of sex seems to be Csw1 dw{1 ðÞ at least in the case of some
sexual species.
In this model a phenotype of an individual h is described by its
conditional probabilities aij to possess sex i in environment of sex j.
For two sexes F and M, it comprises two independent evolvable
parameters aFM,aFF ðÞ corresponding to the conditional probabil-
ities to possess sex F in a M- and a F-environment respectively.
They define the entire set of the conditional probabilities
apq : aFM, aMM~1{aFM, aFF and aMF~1{aFF. This formal-
ism follows previous works describing behavior by conditional
probabilities [26–30] and allows accounting for any sex determin-
ing mechanisms [31].
To determine whether a population composed of identical
individuals aFM,aFF ðÞ is sexual or asexual, as well as to evaluate its
Darwinian fitness, one should determine the corresponding
unconditional probabilities Vpq to possess sex p in environment
q. According to the definition of apq as a conditional probability to
possess sex p in environment q, Vpq equals apq multiplied by the
unconditional probability Eq to be in environment q:
VMM~ 1{aFM ðÞ EM,
VMF~ 1{aFF ðÞ 1{EM ðÞ ,
VFM~aFMEM,
VFF~aFF 1{EM ðÞ :
ð4Þ
Assuming mean-field conditions in a population (properties of the
environment are defined by the average value of individual
properties), the probability to be in a specific environment matches
the individual unconditional probability to possess the correspond-
ing sex:
EM~VMMzVMF: ð5Þ
Eqs. (4) and (5) result in:
EM~
1{aFF
1{aFFzaFM
: ð6Þ
The statistics Vpq can be expressed, therefore, through aFM,aFF ðÞ
only.
A population is sexual when it is composed of individuals with
aFM~1,aFF~0 ðÞ phenotype. This leads to
VMF~VFM~1=2,VMM~VFF~0 ðÞ meaning that these individ-
uals always possess sex that is complementary to the environment.
A population will be asexual when it is composed of individuals
with aFM~0,0ƒaFFƒ1 ðÞ or with 0ƒaFMƒ1,aFF~1 ðÞ , leading
to VMF~VFM~0,VMM~1 or VFF~1 or VMM~VFF~1=2 re-
spectively. The sexual state of a population will be characterized
by R, the probability to be in the sex opposite to the environment:
R~VFMzVMF. A population is sexual when R~1, and asexual
for R~0 (see Fig. 1).
The evolutionary stability of sex as a function of its cost Cs is
presented in Fig. 2 (for derivation see ‘‘Evolutionary stability
of sex’’). For the sake of simplicity, we reduce the payoff
table (1) to a two parameter form (see ‘‘Derivation of
normalization’’):
Sex Is Worth Its Two-Fold Cost
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 July 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 7 | e6012Wpq~
FM
F 1 c
Mb 0
: ð7Þ
The cost of sex (2) becomes:
Cs~
2
bzc
: ð8Þ
The stability of sexual population and the corresponding cost of
sex as a contour plot are shown for values of payoffs b and c.I t
should be stressed that transition from (2) to (8) is valid only for
WMM%WFF, which applies probably to all sexual species.
Greater values of WMM increase the effective cost of sex at each
point of the payoff space b,c ðÞ .
Discussion
Sexual populations aFM~1,aFF~0 ðÞ can be evolutionary
stable at up to a two-fold cost Cs~2, see Fig. 2. At this cost all
additional benefits and shortcomings of sex equilibrate each other
(d~0, see eq. (3)). This result eliminates the assumption, adopted
previously, that sex remains stable only if its benefits overcome its
shortcomings Csv1 (dv{1). It also explains a peculiar
equilibrium between sexual and asexual populations in nature:
small deviations from the two-fold cost d jj %1 may lead to either
sexual or asexual development, corresponding to species that have
developed and lost sex during their evolution. It is interesting to
note that for the case where only equal parental contribution to
the offspring’s genome accounts for one’s fitness (corresponding to
WFM~WMF, b~c~0:5 and Cs~2) sex remains unstable. The
stability can be achieved either through additional benefits (such as
diversity, etc.) which reduce the cost of sex or by a certain
asymmetry in male and female payoffs (WFM=WMF), while Cs
remains unchanged.
The maintenance of sexual reproduction, despite a more
beneficial parthenogenesis, may be explained briefly as follows.
With developed sensing abilities, the individual choice to spend
more time as F for the sake of beneficial WFF payoffs leads to F vs.
M encounters (with corresponding payoff WFM), since other
members of the population are able to sense and exploit this
behavior by adjusting their reproductive mode to M.
Three and more sexes can not be evolutionary stable. We define
multiple sexes as an equal sharing of the offspring’s genome
between more than two parent organisms (see previous treatments
of this problem [4,32]). To show this, we assume a population to
be sexual if its members, when placed in a sexually pure
environment, choose with equal probability a sex that is different
from the environment. This definition is an extrapolation of the
predisposition to be a male in a female environment and vice versa
to the case of hypothetical multi-parental reproduction mechan-
isms(it does not consider other mechanisms that are considered as
multi-sexual though include explicit requirements for two parents,
such as reproduction of acellular slime molds [33], fungus
Schizophyllum and some social insects [34]). Our approach leads
to fractional values of the parameters apq for more than two sexes,
causing the corresponding populations to be evolutionary unstable
(for instance in the case of three sexes: a11~0,a21~a31~1=2) (see
Figure 1. Evolution of sexual reproduction as development of
sex switching and sensing abilities. Contour plot of R (probability
to possess sex complementary to the environment) in populations with
varying individual switch and sensor characteristics. The switch/sensor
complex is described by aFM and aFF, representing conditional
probabilities to possess sex F in M and F environments respectively.
The single point 6denotes a fully developed sexual population (R~1)
while there exist multiple possibilities for asexual populations (R~0).
Evolution is equivalent to the motion of a point, denoting a population,
from an asexual state to the sexual endpoint. Specific evolutionary
mechanisms correspond to different evolutionary pathways.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006012.g001
Figure 2. Evolutionary stability of sexual population for
different values of cost of sex. The space of evolutionary payoffs,
separated into sexual (dark grey) and asexual (light grey) evolutionary
stable regions, superimposed on a contour plot of the cost of sex (Cs).
Many previous works suggested that sex is stable only if its fitness is
higher than the parthenogenetic one (Csv1 region). We demonstrate
that the sensor/switch abilities make sex evolutionary stable for up to
two-fold cost (Cs~2). No stability is possible for Csw2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006012.g002
Sex Is Worth Its Two-Fold Cost
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more than two sexes’’).
An experimental verification of the presented results seems to be
possible following the approach of a recent experimental work
[35]. It has shown the feasibility to measure the reproductive
success of males and females in different environments. Moreover
it indicates a possible negative influence exerted by competing
males on the reproductive success of asexual females (WFMvWFF
or cv1). To determine payoffs (1) and the corresponding cost of
sex (2) one should measure the reproductive success of each sex in
every possible environment (F in F, F in M, M in F and M in M).
This work suggests a rationale for maintenance of sex, providing
a universally applicable reason for overcoming the two-fold cost of
sex barrier. It explains the widespread phenomenon of sexual
reproduction by its link to even more frequently occurring sensing
abilities. It allows subsuming existing and future explanations in a
framework that decouples the specific mechanisms dealing with
emergence and maintenance of sex from the two-fold cost issue.
The results are based on a novel approach to incorporate
communication in evolutionary game theory, which can be
extended to a general analysis of evolution of information
exchange and intelligence [36].
Analysis
Evolutionary stability of sex
Consider a population composed of a host h, characterized by
ah
FM,ah
FF
  
that is challenged by a mutant m, characterized by
am
FM,am
FF
  
~ ah
FMzDam
FM,ah
FFzDam
FF
  
. The evolutionary stabil-
ity of such a population requires that no mutant is fitter than the
host:
Gm ðÞ {Gh ðÞ ƒ0, ð9Þ
where Gk ðÞ is the fitness of individual k.
The fitness is determined by the individual probabilities V
k
pq to
possess sex p in environment q, and by the corresponding payoffs
Wpq:
G(k)~
X
pq
V
k
pqWpq: ð10Þ
Following eqs. (4) and (6):
G(h)~
X
pq
ah
pqEqWpq, ð11Þ
and
G(m)~
X
pq
am
pqEqWpq, ð12Þ
where Eq (6) is defined solely by the host’s values of ah
FM,ah
FF
  
since we assume that the amount of mutants is small.
Following eqs. (11), (12) and (7), the condition for evolutionary
stability (9) becomes:
Dam
FMEMc{Dam
FF 1{EM ðÞ b{1 ðÞ ƒ0: ð13Þ
This expression divides, for each specific population (a point in
phenotype space ah
FM,ah
FF
  
), the phenotype space into two semi-
planes corresponding to favorable and non-favorable mutations
(see Fig. 3).
According to (13), a sexual population ah
FM~1,ah
FF~0
  
is
evolutionary stable for bw1 and cw0. For other payoff values, a
population converges to asexual states with ah
FM~0
  
or
ah
FF~1
  
. As shown in Fig. 3, the linear properties of (13) prevent
formation of stable points with fractional values of apq for sexual
populations (unless sex q is not present, Eq~0 and the
corresponding values apq are irrelevant). This remains valid for
more than two sexes (see ‘‘Evolutionary stability for more than two
sexes’’ for a rigorous proof).
Derivation of normalization
Reduction of the payoff table:
Wpq~
FM
FW FF WFM
MW MF WMM
: ð14Þ
to its two parameters form (7) requires two transformations:
W’pq~Wpq{WMM, ð15Þ
and
W’’pq~W’pq
 
W’FF{W’MM ðÞ : ð16Þ
Consequently, the parameters b and c in (7) are:
Figure 3. Evolutionary stability of sexual reproduction. The
equation for evolutionary stability (13) defines positive and negative
semi-planes, corresponding to favorable and non-favorable mutations,
dependent on payoffs b and c. A population with arbitrary aFM and aFF
(I) will always dispose of a positive region, precluding so an
evolutionary stable solution. A sexual population (II) is evolutionary
stable since no positive direction is available. The population on the
aFM (III) and aFF (IV) edges are also unstable. If we assume opposite
signs for the semi-planes as consequence of different payoff values, the
asexual populations (positioned on the edges aFM~0 or aFF~1)
become stable, while the sexual population becomes unstable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006012.g003
Sex Is Worth Its Two-Fold Cost
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WMF{WMM
WFF{WMM
,
c~
WFM{WMM
WFF{WMM
:
ð17Þ
The transformations (15) and (15) do not affect the stability
condition (9). Taking into account (11), (9) becomes P
pq DVpqWpqƒ0:
DVFFWFFzDVFMWFMz...
zDVMFWMFzDVMMWMMƒ0:
ð18Þ
where DVpq~ V
m
pq{V
h
pq
  
.
Applying the first transformation (15) to (18) results in:
DVFFW’FFzDVFMW’FMz...
zDVMFW’MFzDVMMW’MMz...
zWMM
X
pq
DVpqƒ0:
ð19Þ
The last term in the left part vanishes
P
pq DVpq~0
  
preserving
the form of condition (10). The second transformation (16)
converts (19) into
P
pq DVpqW’’pqƒ0.
Expressions for cost of sex (8) and the ratio of fitness in asexual
and sexual population Cs~WFF= WFMzWMF ðÞ =2 ðÞ are identi-
cal only in case WMM~0. Otherwise, using (17):
2
bzc
~
2WFF{2WMM
WMFzWFM{2WMM
: ð20Þ
Finite positive values of WMM, therefore, increase effective cost of
sex:
2
bzc
w
2WFF
WMFzWFM
: ð21Þ
Evolutionary stability for more than two sexes
In case of a population with more than two sexes, the
corresponding values of apq are fractional and located on the
edges (rather than nodes) of the phenotype space(see Fig. 3). Such
populations can not be evolutionary stable, since, in general, the
phenotype space apq
  
is a K dimensions cube, while evolutionary
favorable and unfavorable mutations are defined by a K{1
dimensional surface (e.g. see (13)). For instance, the only possibility
to confine a point with a line (K~1) on the edge of a square
(K~2) is when the line is parallel to the edge (see Fig. 3, point IV).
This occurs if the corresponding sex q is not present in the
population (Eq~0). The same reasoning applies to multiple sexes,
with K dimensional cube and K{1 dimensional constraint for
evolutionary stability.
A rigorous proof is as follows. The evolutionary stability of
specific value of aij~ast requires LG
 
Laij~0 at ast in case ast=0
and ast=1. In case of multiple sexes, the expression for fitness
remains identical to (11):
G~
X
pq
apqEqWpq: ð22Þ
Taking into account that
P
pq apq~1, eq. (22) may be rewritten
as:
G~
X
p=N,q
apqEqWpqz...
z
X
q
1{
X
p=N
apq
 !
EqWNq,
ð23Þ
where apq p=N ðÞ are independent parameters. Consequently:
LG
Laij
~EjWij{EjWNj, ð24Þ
This expression vanishes for Ej~0 (sex j is not present in the
population) or for Wij~WNj (states i and N are degenerate in
environment j).
Comparison with model games
In the evolutionary game theory, the payoffs (7) are separated
into standard model games. According to this work, the games of
Leader bwc,cw1 ðÞ , Battle of the Sexes bvc,bw1 ðÞ and Chicken
bw1,0vcv1 ðÞ lead to development of sexual reproduction, while
Prisoner’s dilemma bw1,cv0 ðÞ promotes asexual populations.
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